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The introduction of Medicare Part D has generated interest in the cost of providing drug coverage
to the elderly.  Of paramount importance -- often unaccounted for in budget estimates -- are the salutary
effects that increased prescription drug use might have on other Medicare spending.  This paper uses
longitudinal data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) to estimate how prescription
drug benefits affect Medicare spending.  We compare spending and service use for Medigap enrollees
with and without drug coverage.  Because of concerns about selection, we use variation in supply-side
regulations of the individual insurance market -- including guaranteed issue and community rating
-- as instruments for prescription drug coverage.  We employ a discrete factor model to control for
individual-level heterogeneity that might induce bias in the effects of drug coverage.  Medigap prescription
drug coverage increases drug spending by $170 or 22%, and reduces Medicare Part A spending by
$350 or 13% (in 2000 dollars).  Medigap prescription drug coverage reduces Medicare Part B spending,
but the estimates are not statistically significant.  Overall, a $1 increase in prescription drug spending
is associated with a $2.06 reduction in Medicare spending.  Furthermore, the substitution effect decreases
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The primary objective of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act (MMA) was to provide seniors with affordable coverage for their 
prescription medications through the new Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit.  
After the MMA was signed—but before Part D was implemented—there was a very 
public controversy about the cost of the program.  In March 2004, the Medicare Chief 
Actuary testified before the House Ways and Means Committee that he was ordered by 
the (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) CMS Administrator to suppress his 
estimates of the 10-year cost of the program, which were substantially greater than 
original Congressional Budget Office estimates. 
In fact, soaring costs have not materialized.  According to the 2007 Medicare 
Trustees report, the average 2007 plan bid was about 10 percent lower than in 2006.  
These savings likely reflect a variety of factors, including vigorous plan competition, 
increased generic use, and a general slowing of spending relative to earlier in the decade.  
And there are even more reasons to be optimistic, since these estimates do not reflect the 
increasingly important role prescription drugs play in improving health outcomes by 
replacing surgery and other invasive treatments, and quickening recovery for patients 
who receive these treatments.  Official estimates of the costs of Part D do not take these 
savings into account, in part because the magnitude and degree of such savings remain an 
open question among the elderly and disabled population.  While not designed to provide 
estimates of the cost savings in Part D, this paper does provide insight into the potential 
of Part D to improve the fiscal outlook for both Parts A and B.   
  - 2 -  Medicare only partially covers medical services for seniors, and prescription 
drugs were not covered before 2006.
1  Supplemental Medicare was designed to fill this 
gap.  Beneficiaries can get prescription drug benefits from their former employers or 
from Medicaid or other public programs, by enrolling in Medicare managed care
2, or by 
purchasing Medigap
3.  Although many beneficiaries had some source of drug coverage, 
38% still had no coverage at all in 1999 (Laschober et al., 2002). 
Economic theory suggests that when a drug benefit lowers the price of 
prescription drugs, it should increase the use of prescription drugs and complements of 
prescription drugs and decrease the use of substitutes of prescription drugs.  It is unclear, 
however, whether prescription drugs and other medical services, including inpatient care 
and outpatient care, are substitutes or complements.  On the one hand, people with 
prescription drug coverage may be more likely to have doctor visits to get the drugs they 
need, and inpatient care and outpatient care are often combined with prescription drugs in 
the treatment of many illnesses.  In that sense, prescription drugs and other medical 
services are complements.  On the other hand, some diseases can be treated by either 
prescription drugs or inpatient and outpatient care, and prescription drugs can improve 
health outcomes, reduce illness, and, thus, reduce the demand for medical care.  In that 
sense, prescription drugs and other medical services are substitutes.  Therefore, the 
absence of prescription drug coverage and the presence of generous coverage on inpatient 
and outpatient care would result in inefficient overall health care utilization:  the 
                                                 
1Medicare did cover physician-administered drugs and a small number of self-administered drugs. 
Examples of Medicare-covered self-administered drugs include blood clotting factors, epoetin alfa for 
dialysis patients, immunosuppressive drugs after a Medicare-covered transplant, certain oral cancer drugs, 
and certain oral anti-emetic drugs. 
2Most Medicare managed care plans have prescription drug benefit. 
3Medigap is the short name for “Medicare Supplement Insurance” that is designed to fill some of the “gaps 
in coverage” left by Medicare. 
  - 3 -  underuse of prescription drugs and the overuse of inpatient and outpatient care (Goldman 
and Philipson, 2007).  Furthermore, to the extent that these cross-price elasticities vary by 
income, then overall efficiency could be improved by further subsidizing the poor. 
Few randomized studies have examined the effects of prescription drug benefits 
or cost-sharing on prescription drug use and the use of other medical services.  The 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) found the cost-sharing response to 
prescription drugs (ε=-0.27) is similar to that for all ambulatory medical services 
(Newhouse, 1993) in the non-elderly population.  However, in the HIE, the pharmacy 
benefits perfectly co-varied with other medical benefits (by design), whereas the real 
question is how changes in pharmacy benefits, holding medical benefits constant, affect 
spending.   Several observational studies have tried to disentangle these effects using 
quasi-experimental designs.  Goldman et al (2007) recently reviewed 132 studies on the 
effects of cost-sharing.  The evidence clearly demonstrates that increased cost-sharing is 
associated with lower pharmaceutical use.  These effects can be quite large—even for 
chronic medications—suggesting there will be long-term health consequences.  However, 
the direct evidence on the link between cost-sharing and health is rather limited.  Most 
studies examine important proxies for health (and medical spending) such as emergency 
department use and hospitalizations.  The findings from studies focusing solely on the 
chronically-ill are unambiguous: for patients with congestive heart failure (Cole et al., 
2006), lipid disorders (Gibson et al., 2006 and Goldman et al., 2006), diabetes (Mahoney, 
2005), and schizophrenia (Soumerai et al., 1994), greater use of inpatient and emergency 
medical services are associated with higher copayments or cost-sharing for prescription 
  - 4 -  drugs or benefit caps.  These findings are corroborated by the one paper that looked at 
clinical outcomes for a population with benefit caps (Hsu et al., 2006).   
By contrast, studies that look at the effects of cost-sharing more broadly (on all 
drugs or a wide range of classes)—are ambiguous in their findings.  Some find that 
higher cost-sharing is associated with adverse outcomes (Lingle et al., 1987), particularly 
among vulnerable populations such as the elderly and poor (Tamblyn et al., 2001 and 
Soumerai et al., 1991).  But most find that—when the population is not limited to certain 
chronic illnesses—the effects of prescription drug cost containment policies are mostly 
benign.  For example, studies by Fairman et al. (2003),  Motheral and Fairman (2001),  
Johnson et al. (1997) and Smith and Kirking (1992) find that increased co-payments were 
not associated with more outpatient visits, hospitalizations, or emergency department 
visits.  On the other hand, Gaynor et al. (2006) found that cost-sharing for prescription 
drugs reduces both use of, and spending on, prescription drugs, increases spending on 
outpatient care, and increases spending on inpatient care for those who are users of 
impatient care. 
One of the reasons for the discrepancy in the findings is that any observational 
study must account for the endogeneity of prescription drug coverage, and most do not do 
an adequate job.  Lillard et al. (1999) used an instrumental variable approach 
(instrumental variables include employment history for employer-sponsored benefits, 
measures of permanent income and wealth, the urbanicity of area of residence, lagged 
health status and lagged measures of presence of private health insurance for Medigap 
coverage) to estimate the effect of drug benefits on drug spending.  Yang et al. (2004) 
used a discrete factor model to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity and Khan 
  - 5 -  et al. (2007) adopted an individual fixed-effects model.  These two studies found that 
prescription drug benefits either have no effects on non-drug medical spending or slightly 
increase non-drug medical spending.  None of these studies, however, fully distinguish 
different sources of drug benefits.  But even more importantly, none of these studies 
controls for the generosity of the medical benefits in estimating the effects of prescription 
drugs.  Because health insurance with a drug benefit is more likely to have more generous 
non-drug benefits, the cross-price effect is subject to underestimation when the generosity 
of the medical benefits is not held constant. 
In this paper, we use the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) to 
examine spending of Medicare beneficiaries with Medicare coverage and a Medigap 
supplemental plan with or without a drug benefit.  While the Medigap prescription drug 
coverage may not be broadly representative, this study design has the appealing feature 
that the medical benefits are completely known and are relatively homogeneous across 
plan types.  Thus, the quasi-experimental design is one in which medical benefits are held 
constant, but drug coverage is allowed to vary.  We use state reforms in the individual 
health insurance market
4 as instrumental variables and a discrete factor model to address 
the endogeneity of Medigap drug coverage.  Finally, we interact prescription drug 
benefits with income to examine how the effects of drug coverage vary by income.  We 
find that a $1 increase in prescription drug spending is associated with a $2.06 reduction 
in Medicare spending.  Furthermore, the substitution effect decreases as income rises, and 
thus provides support for the low-income assistance program of Medicare Part D. 
                                                 
4 Sometimes it is also called non-group health insurance market. 
  - 6 -  2 Data 
The MCBS is a nationally representative sample of aged, disabled, and 
institutionalized Medicare beneficiaries. The MCBS attempts to interview each 
respondent 12 times over three years, regardless of whether he or she resides in the 
community or a facility or transitions between community and facility settings.  The 
disabled (under 65 years of age) and oldest-old (85 years of age or older) are over-
sampled.  The first round of interviewing was conducted in 1991.  Originally, the survey 
was a longitudinal sample with periodic supplements and indefinite periods of 
participation.  In 1994, the MCBS switched to a rotating panel design with limited 
periods of participation.  Each fall, a new panel is introduced, with a target sample size of 
12,000 respondents, and each summer a panel is retired.  Institutionalized respondents are 
interviewed by proxy.  The MCBS contains comprehensive self-reported information on 
the health status, health care use and expenditures, health insurance coverage, and 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the entire spectrum of Medicare 
beneficiaries.  We use data from the 1992-2000 MCBS in the analysis. 
Measuring Spending 
Our primary dependent variables are Medicare Part A spending
5, Medicare Part B 
spending
6, and prescription drug spending by Medicare beneficiaries.  Medicare Part A 
and Part B spending is based on Medicare claims data, linked to the MCBS.  Medicare 
                                                 
5Medicare Part A covers care in hospitals as an inpatient, critical access hospitals (small facilities that give 
limited outpatient and inpatient to people in rural areas), skilled nursing facilities, hospice care, and some 
home health care. 
6Medicare Part B covers doctor’s services, outpatient hospital care, and some other medical services that 
Part A does not cover, such as the services of physical and occupational therapists, and some home health 
care.  Medicare Part B helps pay for these covered services and supplies when they are medically 
necessary. 
  - 7 -  Part A and Part B spending in different years is adjusted using the Consumer Price Index 
and reported in 2000 dollars.  Prescription drug spending is based on respondent self-
reports and may be underreported.  The CMS Office of the Actuary compared self-
reporting of expenses associated with physician office visits with Medicare claims 
records and found underreporting of 33%. This result has led the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) and others to assume drug expenditures are underreported by a similar 
amount.  However, because drugs are more salient (and regular) than physician office 
visits, they are less likely to be underreported.  Subsequent analyses by CMS staff 
suggest drug expenses are probably underreported by 10–15%. This estimate is based on 
examining records from people who were known to have accurate self-reported data—
that is, people who reported the same patterns of Part A and B utilization as indicated by 
the claims records.  Using this sub-sample, CMS developed an imputation scheme for 
drug expenses.  A comparison of imputed expenditures for the entire MCBS sample with 
actual reported expenditures yielded the 10–15% estimate.  As such, we assume that total 
drug expenses are underreported by 15% in all our analyses (Goldman et al., 2002). 
Measuring Insurance Coverage 
Medicare and Medicaid coverage is based on administrative records.  In addition, 
up to five plans are reported based on questions about plan type (private employer-
sponsored, Medigap, private unknown, private HMO or Medicare HMO), start and end 
date, number of people covered, annual premium, prescription drug benefit, and nursing 
home care.  Because the exact benefit structure is unavailable, all insurance measures are 
dummy variables. 
  - 8 -  Measuring Health 
  We focus on major disease conditions, functional status, and risk factors that are 
known to be strongly associated with prescription drug and medical spending.  
Conditions include diabetes, cancer (excluding skin cancer), heart disease (myocardial 
infarction, heart attack, angina, coronary heart disease, congestive heart failure, or other 
heart condition), hypertension, stroke, lung disease (emphysema, asthma, or chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease), Alzheimer’s disease, and osteoarthritis.  Functional 
status is typically measured by limitations in Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and 
Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADLs) in empirical studies.  ADLs are defined 
as any difficulty dressing, eating, bathing, getting in/out of chair, walking, and using 
toilet or being bedridden.  IADLs are defined as any difficulty using the phone, doing 
light housework, doing heavy housework, making meals, shopping, or managing money.  
Risk factor measures include current smoking and obesity (defined as BMI over 30).  
Self-reported overall health is rated from 1 to 5 (1= excellent, 2=very good, 3=good, 
4=fair, and 5=poor).  Other variables included in our analysis are age, gender, race, 
education, metropolitan area (urban), and income.   
We dropped beneficiaries from our data who were under 65, had partial or no 
Medicare coverage, were in Medicare HMOs or Medicaid, resided in nursing home 
facilities, were currently employed, or had multiple supplemental insurances.  All the 
remaining beneficiaries in our data had a Medigap plan with or without a prescription 
drug benefit as their only supplemental insurance.  The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act (OBRA) of 1990 requires that Medigap plans be standardized in as many as ten 
different benefit packages offering varying levels of supplemental coverage.  All policies 
  - 9 -  sold since July 1992 (except in three exempted states:  Massachusetts, Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin)
1 have conformed to one of these ten standardized benefit packages, known as 
plans A to J.  Plans H, I and J have prescription drug benefits.  A high-deductible option 
is also available for plans F and J.  Policies sold prior to July 1992 are not required to 
comply with these ten standard packages.  Medigap plans with and without prescription 
drug benefits, on average, have similar coverage for non-drug medical care (Table 1).  
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the beneficiaries in our data by 
Medigap plan type (with and without prescription drug benefits).  Compared to those 
with prescription drug benefits, Medicare beneficiaries without drug benefits tend to be 
older, less educated, less likely to be in an urban area, and poorer.  They are sicker in 
term of both self-reported overall health and histories of chronic diseases, with 
significantly higher prevalence of diabetes, cancer, and stroke.  They have less 
prescription drug spending but more Medicare Part A spending.   
The observed differences between those with prescription drug benefits and those 
without prescription drug benefits seem to indicate potential self-selection, but the 
direction is unclear.  Richer and more educated beneficiaries are more likely to have 
prescription drug coverage and tend to have higher prescription drug spending; the sicker 
are less likely to have prescription drug coverage but they also tend to have higher 
prescription drug spending.  The literature provides strong evidence of the presence of 
moral hazard in the Medigap market.  The results on self-selection, however, are mixed.  
Wolfe and Goddeeris (1991) estimated health care utilization for Medicare beneficiaries 
and found that those with large past expenditures were more likely to hold private 
supplemental insurance.  Ettner (1997) found that respondents who purchase private 
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reimbursement, even after controlling for moral hazard.  Hurd and McGarry (1997) found 
there was little relationship between observed health measures and the propensity to hold 
or purchase private insurance and argued that the differences in health care services 
reflect moral hazard rather than adverse selection.  There is little direct evidence, but the 
literature seems to suggest adverse selection into prescription drug benefits (Pauly and 
Zeng, 2006).  
The observed difference in health measures can also be the result of the 
improvement in health because of increased prescription drug use for people who had 
prescription drug benefits.  If that is the case, the model with health measures as 
covariates would underestimate the reduction in Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B 
spending and overestimate the increase in prescription drug spending as a result of 
prescription drug benefits. 
3 Empirical  Specification 
Medicare beneficiaries make their choice between Medigap plans with and 
without prescription drug benefits by maximizing their indirect utility.  The utility index 
d
* is a function of sociodemographic characteristics, health status, exogenous shocks on 
Medigap market, and an individual unobserved component: 
1 2 1 0 * ε α α α + + + = Z X d  
We do not directly observe d*.  Instead, we observe individuals with drug benefits when 
d*>0 and without drug benefits when d*≤0. 
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Here, X denotes individual sociodemographic characteristics and health status; Z denotes 
exogenous shocks; and d is a dummy variable for prescription drug benefits.  
Sociodemographic characteristics include age, gender, race (white or nonwhite), marital 
status, college education or higher, urbanicity, and income.  Health measures include 
ever-smoked, obesity, general health index
7, and chronic diseases, including cancer, heart 
disease, hypertension, stroke, lung disease, Alzheimer’s disease, and osteoarthritis.  We 
also include Adjusted Average Per Capita Cost (AAPCC) by county to control for 
regional difference in medical care costs.  In addition, we include state and year fixed 
effects in our model. 
The distribution of medical expenses has two characteristics (Duan, Manning, 
Morris and Newhouse 1982).  First, there are many zero expenses.  Second, the 
remaining positive expenses are highly skewed, but the positive expenses are 
approximately log-normally distributed through most of their range.  The econometric 
and statistical literatures provide a number of models for dealing with this kind of data.  
We adopt a typical two-part structure in modeling spending.  The first part models the 
probability of having positive spending and the second part uses a log-linear specification 
to model spending conditional on positive spending.  The any spending equation is: 
2 3 2 1 0 * * ε β β β β + + + + = Income d d X p  
                                                 
7The construction of the health index is similar to Dor et al. (2003).  The health index is a summary of self-
reported overall health (1–5), number of IADL (0–6) and number of ADL (0–6).  All three components are 
coded so that lower values indicate better health. 
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Log spending conditional on positive spending: 
3 3 2 1 0 * ) 0 | ln( ε γ γ γ γ + + + + = > Income d d X Y Y  
Here, Y denotes Medicare Part A spending, Medicare Part B spending, or prescription 
drug spending.  We also include a variable for whether people have nursing home 
coverage to control for the generosity of their insurance coverage. 
Identification 
We use state reforms in the individual health insurance market as instrumental 
variables to address the endogeneity of prescription drug benefits.  These state reforms 
were aimed at reducing the number of uninsured and increasing the availability and 
affordability of individual health insurance.  These reforms include rate rating, pre-
existing condition restrictions, guaranteed issues, guaranteed renewal, reinsurance, and 
minimum loss ratio and were mostly passed in the early to mid-1990s.  Here, we focus on 
the two most dramatic measures: guaranteed issue and rate rating: 
•  Guaranteed issue requires health plans to offer coverage to all individuals, 
regardless of their health status or claims experience.  
•  Rate rating includes rating bands, very tight rating bands, and community 
rating.  Rating bands restrict health plans’ use of experience, health status, or 
duration of coverage in setting premium rates for individuals.  Very tight 
rating bands allow very limited adjustment for experience, health status, and 
  - 13 - duration.  Community rating prohibits health plans’ use of experience, health 
status, or duration of coverage in setting premium rates for individual 
coverage.  Some community rating laws also prohibit the use of demographic 
factors in setting premium rates for individual coverage. 
The impacts of these reforms are mixed.  In states that adopted the most 
comprehensive reforms ⎯guaranteed issue often combined with such other reforms as 
guaranteed renewability, rate rating, and strict limits on exclusions for pre-existing 
conditions ⎯insurance became more widely available, although comprehensive reforms 
generally resulted in some carrier departures from individual health insurance markets 
and less choice of insurance products (Swartz, 2000).  That is, fewer policies were 
available for people to purchase.  Studies indicate that access to individual insurance 
policies for people at high risk clearly increased in the comprehensive reforms states of 
New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Vermont, and Washington.
8  The research thus 
provides some evidence that guaranteed issue of all policies assumes the availability of 
policies to anyone regardless of risk factors, such as health status and prior use of health 
services.   
Community rating generally resulted in higher premiums on average, lower 
premiums for high-risk individuals, and higher premiums for low-risk enrollees (Swartz, 
2000; Hall, 2000; and Kirk, 2000).  States with more comprehensive reforms experienced 
a decrease in overall coverage rates (Zuckerman and Rajan, 1999; Percy, 2000; Sloan and 
Conover, 1998; and Marsteller et al., 1998).  However, Buchmueller and DiNardo (2002), 
                                                 
8Institute for Health Policy Solutions, “State Experiences with Community Rating Reforms,” Prepared for 
the Kaiser Family Foundation, September 1995; Maine Department of Professional and Financial 
Regulation, “White Paper: Maine’s Individual Health Insurance Market,” Prepared by the Staff of the 
Maine Bureau of Insurance, January, 2001 
  - 14 - looking at how coverage rates changed in a comprehensive reform state, New York, 
compared to two states that did not enact such reforms, Pennsylvania and Connecticut, 
found that New York’s community rating law was not responsible for changing the rate 
of coverage but was responsible for changing the nature of individual insurance from 
largely indemnity to HMO coverage. 
In New York, the risk pool changed ⎯ average number of claims per 
policyholder and average age of policyholders increased (Hall, 2000).  In New Jersey, the 
evidence suggests a more complicated picture, one in which age of enrollees increased 
but the health status of enrollees remained relatively good.  Swartz and Garnick (2000) 
compared self-reported health status, age, and other risk characteristics of enrollees in 
individual policies compared with the state’s uninsured and employer-covered 
populations after the New Jersey reforms were implemented.  They found that enrollees 
with individual coverage were more likely to be older than the uninsured but also more 
likely to be healthier.  Lo Sasso and Lurie (2003) analyzed data from the Bureau of 
Census Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and concluded that 
community rating reforms make healthy people less likely to be insured and unhealthy 
people more likely to be insured by individual polices; as a result, the enrollees with 
individual policies in community rating states were sicker. 
Although these reforms may not have achieved their goal of reducing the number 
of uninsured and making health insurance more affordable, they nevertheless generate 
some exogenous shocks to the individual health insurance markets from both the supply 
side and the demand side.  Past studies have exclusively focused on the effects of state 
reforms on coverage rate, premiums, and change in risk pool and found that sicker 
  - 15 - individuals are more likely to purchase health insurance in states with reforms.  The 
empirical evidence is consistent with economic theory that sicker individuals would buy 
more insurance with more risk pooling, and we speculate it would be also true that sicker 
individuals are more likely to purchase health plans with more comprehensive coverage, 
such as plans with prescription drug benefits.  While federal regulations in the Medigap 
market are very limited
9, state reforms in the individual health insurance market further 
limit health plans’ ability of risk adjustment ⎯ denying coverage and/or setting high 
premiums for the sicker elderly.  Elderly who did not get Medigap coverage can purchase 
it later and can postpone the decision of purchasing a Medigap plan.  Elderly also can 
easily switch to another Medigap plan as they wish after the initial enrollment period.   
In this paper, we will explore the fact that state reforms reduced coverage rates 
through both the demand side and supply side and that state reforms changed the risk 
pool of enrollees.  Guaranteed issue and rate rating are unlikely to operate independently 
because, with guaranteed issue but not rate rating, health plans can simply charge 
prohibitive premiums to drive risky individuals out of the market.  Likewise, with rate 
rating but not guaranteed issue, health plans can just refuse to offer a policy to potentially 
risky individuals.  In states with guaranteed issue requirements, some kind of rate rating 
                                                 
9Federal law provides Medicare beneficiaries with guaranteed access to Medigap policies offered in their 
state of residence during an initial six-month enrollment period, which begins on the first day of the month 
in which an individual is 65 or older and is enrolled in Medicare Part B.  During this initial open-
enrollment period, an insurer cannot deny Medigap coverage for any plan types they sell to eligible 
individuals, place conditions on the policies, or charge a higher price because of past or present health 
problems.  Additional federal Medigap protections include guaranteed issue rights, which provide 
beneficiaries over age 65 with access to plans A, B, C, or F in certain circumstances, such as when their 
employer terminates retiree health benefits or their Medicare + choice plan leaves the program or stops 
serving their areas.  Individuals must apply for a Medigap plan no later than 63 days after their prior health 
coverage ends for these guarantees to apply.  During the guaranteed-issue periods, no pre-existing 
conditions exclusion period may be applied. 
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both guaranteed issue and rate rating; states with only rate rating; and states with neither. 
For state reforms to be valid instruments, two conditions have to be met.  First, 
they need to be a strong predictor of prescription drug coverage.  Second, they need to be 
independent of unobserved determinants of health care spending.  The first condition is 
testable, and we report the Wald statistics for joint significance of state regulations in 
predicting individual prescription drug coverage.  The second condition cannot be tested 
directly.  Although these reforms were primarily targeting the individual health insurance 
market for people under age 65 to reduce the number of uninsured, it may be a proxy for 
something else at the state level that is correlated with both state reforms and 
determinants of individual health care spending.  We include state and year fixed effects 
in the model.  Furthermore, if this is the case, then it should hold not only for Medigap 
coverage, but also for employer-sponsored coverage.   
Table 3 shows the predictive power of state reforms on prescription drug benefits 
for both Medigap and employer-sponsored coverage.  States reforms strongly predict 
prescription drug coverage for Medigap, but not for employer-sponsored coverage.  So, 
while state reforms, on average, reduce the amount of insurance purchased in the 
Medigap market, they appear not to be approximating other state-level variables that also 
affect employer-sponsored drug benefits.   
We further regress state reforms on lagged Medicare Part A spending, Medicare 
Part B spending, and prescription drug spending to see if states with reforms have 
different health care spending trends from states without reforms.  Table 4 shows that 
  - 17 - past spending trends do not predict state reforms.  It is also worth noting that the effects 
of state reforms on prescription drug benefits in our analysis are identified across states 
and over time because state reforms were enacted after 1992, the first period of our data. 
Unobserved Individual Heterogeneity 
The error terms in the three equations discussed earlier are likely to be correlated 
with each other, and we estimate them jointly to allow for this correlation.  We adopt a 
modified version of the model in Mroz (1999), Goldman, Leibowitz, and Buchanan 
(1998), and Goldman et al. (2001) and assume all error terms have an unobservable 
heterogeneity componentη: 
1 1 1 υ η ε + =  
2 2 2 υ η ε + =  
3 3 3 υ η ε + =  
We assume that  1 υ , 2 υ   3 υ  and  s ' η are independent, that  1 υ and 2 υ are standard normal 
errors and that  3 υ has mean zero and variance .  Because the prescription drug benefit 
equation and any spending equation are binary choice models, the variances are not 
identified.   
2 σ
Miss-specifying a continuous distribution for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
would result in inconsistent parameter estimates.  Discrete factor models have been 
widely used in the study of the effects of endogenous dummy variables on a continuous 
outcome with unobserved individual heterogeneity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Cutler, 
  - 18 - 1995; Goldman, 1995; Goldman, Leibowitz and Buchanan, 1998).  Mroz (1999) found 
that when the true model has bivariate normal disturbances, estimators using discrete 
factor approximations compare favorably to efficient estimators in terms of both 
precision and bias; these approximation estimators dominate all the other estimators 
examined when the disturbances are non-normal.  A discrete factor model also 
significantly simplifies the likelihood function and reduces the computational burden of 
the estimation. 
We adopt a semi-parametric approach to model the correlation among error terms 
and assume that  1 η , 2 η  and  3 η  can each take one of three values ( 11 η , 12 η , 13 η ), 
( 21 η , 22 η , 23 η ), ( 31 η , 32 η , 33 η ) with probability  , and  =1- -  , respectively.  
This implies that there are three types of people.  Being each type has different effects on 
drug coverage and health care utilization, (
1 p 2 p 3 p 1 p 2 p
11 η , 12 η , 13 η ) for drug coverage, ( 21 η , 22 η , 23 η ) 
for probability of any health care spending, and ( 31 η , 32 η , 33 η ) for health care spending 
conditional on positive spending.  For example, there is a   probability for someone to 
be type 1, which would imply realization of 
1 p
11 η  for drug coverage,  21 η  for probability of 
any spending, and  31 η  for spending conditional on positive spending.  Reasons for the 
differences among three types of people can be contributed to unobserved health 
characteristics, risk preference, discount rate, life-style preference, etc. 
  - 19 - Since all three equations have intercept terms, we normalize the mean of each 
heterogeneity component to be zero
10.  This model allows non-zero covariance across 
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Then, it is straightforward to write the likelihood function for individual i by integrating 
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N is the sample size and   is the individual weight.  Robust standard errors are reported 
for our coefficient estimates.  
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10For example, the third support in the prescription drug benefit equation can be written as a function of the 
other two supports and probabilities of each support: 
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  - 20 - Simulation 
Because we adopt a two-part model structure for our spending equations, it is 
difficult to interpret the magnitude of the parameter estimates directly.  Furthermore, the 
net effect is unclear when the coefficient on the first part of the two-part model has the 
opposite sign from the coefficient on the second part.  We simulate the average effects of 
prescription drug benefits on prescription drug spending, on Medicare Part A spending, 
and on Medicare Part B spending.  The probability of having positive spending is 
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We use the non-parametric smearing estimates (Duan et al., 1983) to retransform the 
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th) of the 
residuals to better account for heteroscedasticity, and the predicted values well re-
produce the mean spending. 
  - 21 - Then, the expected spending is: 
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4 Results 
Table 5 reports the results from simple two-part models, which adjust for 
observed differences between elderly with drug benefits and elderly without drug 
benefits.  We then use state reforms in the individual insurance market as instrumental 
variables to address potential self-selection and a discrete factor model to account for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity.  Results are shown in Tables 6-8 for prescription 
drug spending, Medicare Part A spending, and Medicare Part B spending, respectively.  
In our model, we include interactions between state reforms and health (age and health 
index) to model changes in health status mix among Medigap enrollees in states with 
reforms.   
In the insurance choice model, state regulations and its interactions with age 
significantly predict prescription drug benefits with p-values around 0.0001.  Guaranteed 
issue and rate rating together increase the likelihood of prescription drug benefits for 
younger elderly and reduce the likelihood of prescription drug benefits for older elderly 
(Figure 1).  The likely explanation is that when health plans are prohibited from using 
health status and history of claims in their decisions about offering insurance and in 
setting premium, age is the best available alternative to sort the elderly by their health 
status.  Rate rating alone reduces the likelihood of prescription drug benefits, but it does 
not vary much with age, which is consistent with the view that, with rate rating but not 
guaranteed issue, health plans simply deny offering insurance to sicker elderly, and, 
  - 22 - therefore, there is no need to use age as an indicator of health status.  Interactions 
between health and regulations seem to suggest that the less healthy are more likely to 
have prescription drug benefits in states with regulations, but the effects are small. 
The effects of prescription drug benefits on the probability of having any 
prescription drug spending increase with income, and the effects of prescription drug 
benefits on prescription drug spending conditional on positive spending decrease with 
income.  Medicare beneficiaries with prescription drug benefits are less likely to have 
positive drug spending (when income is less than $34,000), but incur more drug spending 
conditional on positive spending (when income is less than $333,000).  These two effects 
are either too small or cancel each other out and the net effects of prescription drug 
benefits on prescription drug spending do not appear to vary much with income (Figure 
2), although prescription drug spending itself increases with income.  The discrete factor 
estimates do not indicate a clear direction of self-selection in terms of unobservables.   
The effects of prescription drug benefits on the probability of having any 
Medicare Part A spending increase with income and the effects of prescription drug 
benefits on Medicare Part A spending conditional on positive spending decrease with 
income.  Medicare beneficiaries with prescription drug benefits are less likely to have 
positive Medicare Part A spending (when income is less than $80,600) and incur less 
Medicare Part A spending conditional on positive spending.  The net effects of 
prescription drug benefits on Medicare Part A spending decrease with income (Figure 3).  
The results imply that a $10,000 dollar increase in income is associated with $47 
decrease in the substitution effect between prescription drugs and Medicare Part A.  The 
discrete factor estimates show that 70.3% of beneficiaries who are more likely to have 
  - 23 - prescription drug benefits, are more likely to have positive Medicare Part A spending, 
and incur more Medicare Part A spending conditional on positive spending.  25.1% of 
beneficiaries who are less likely to have prescription drug benefits, are less likely to have 
positive Medicare Part A spending, and incur less Medicare Part A spending conditional 
on positive spending.  This indicates adverse selection into prescription drug benefit in 
terms of unobservables in the sense that those with prescription drug benefits consume 
more medical care covered by Medicare Part A than those without. 
The effects of prescription drug benefits on the probability of having any 
Medicare Part B spending and on Medicare Part B spending conditional on positive 
spending increase with income.  Medicare beneficiaries with prescription drug benefits 
are less likely to have positive Medicare Part B spending (when income is less than 
$36,000) and incur less Medicare Part B spending conditional on positive spending 
(when income is less than $66,000).  The net effects of prescription drug benefits on 
Medicare Part B spending decrease with income (Figure 4).  The results imply that a 
$10,000 dollar increase in income is associated with $35 decrease in the substitution 
effect between prescription drugs and Medicare Part B.  The coefficients on drug benefits 
and its interactions with income are jointly insignificant.  As in the drug spending model, 
discrete factor estimates do not indicate clear direction of self-selection in terms of 
unobservables. 
Table 9 shows the simulated effects of prescription drug benefits on prescription 
drug spending, Medicare Part A spending, and Medicare Part B spending from the simple 
two-part model and from the discrete factor model.   The simple two-part model adjusts 
for observables and the results show that prescription drug benefits increase drug 
  - 24 - spending by $157, reduces Medicare Part A spending by $135, and increases Medicare 
Part B spending by $31. 
When both observables and unobservables are accounted for, prescription drug 
benefits increase drug spending by $148 or 22%.  After adjusting for the underreporting 
of prescription drug spending in MCBS, our estimates suggest that prescription drug 
benefits increase drug spending by $148*(1+15%) = $170; prescription drug benefits 
decrease Medicare Part A spending by $350 or 13%; and prescription drug benefits 
decrease Medicare Part B spending by $74 or 4% although the estimates are statistically 
insignificant. 
5 Discussion 
Among patients with Medigap insurance, those in worse health—both observed 
and unobserved in the MCBS—self-select into prescription drug coverage.  After 
controlling for this selection, our results indicate that prescription drugs and medical 
services covered by Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B are substitutes.  Furthermore, 
these substitution patterns are underestimated when one does not control for this adverse 
selection.  Each $1 increase in drug spending is associated with a steady-state $2.06 
decrease in Medicare Part A spending and $0.44 decrease in Medicare Part B spending.  
Thus, it appears that Medicare beneficiaries may have been overinsured with respect to 
medical services, and underinsured with respect to prescription drugs.  Medicare 
beneficiaries without drug benefits had the incentive to substitute prescription drugs with 
cheaper (to them, but not to Medicare) Medicare covered services (Medicare Part A and 
  - 25 - Part B).  This suggests that Medicare Part D could potentially remove the incentive and 
improve the overall efficiency of health care utilization among the elderly. 
We find that the substitution effect decreases with income; therefore, prescription 
drug benefits would result in more cost savings among the poor.  The simple explanation 
is that prescription drug spending increases with income and the substitution effect 
decreases with prescription drug use.  The increase in prescription drug use from 
prescription drug benefits for people with higher income is more likely to be from 
increased use of non-essential drugs; therefore, it has less effect on health and inpatient 
and outpatient care.  Our results suggest that providing prescription drug benefits to the 
poor would result in more cost savings and, thus, provide support for the low-income 
assistance program of Medicare Part D. 
Prior studies on the Medicare population found that prescription drug benefits 
either have no effect on Medicare Part A and Part B spending or increase Medicare Part 
A and Part B spending.  There are two potential problems with these studies.  First, they 
included beneficiaries with various types of drug coverage in their analysis and, 
therefore, could not adequately address the self-selection into these different types of 
drug coverage.  For example, beneficiaries who have public drug coverage, mainly 
Medicaid drug coverage, are less healthy, less educated, and poor, and beneficiaries who 
have HMO drug coverage are relatively healthy.   
Second, the generosity of non-drug coverage matters because of the non-zero 
cross-price elasticities; and in many previous studies the populations have very different 
medical benefits as well as drug benefits.  Our study focuses on beneficiaries that have 
  - 26 - Medigap supplemental coverage with or without drug coverage and adopts a discrete 
factor model with instrumental variables to address the self-selection problem.  Our 
results are consistent with studies using quasi-experimental designs on the non-elderly 
population (Goldman et al., 2004; Gaynor et al., 2006) and elderly population (Tamblyn 
et al., 2001).  The no finding by Motheral et al. (2001) may be explained by the fact that 
switching from a two-tier prescription co-pay system to a three-tier prescription co-pay 
system only reduces prescription drug spending by about 10% and the study population 
still has a rather generous prescription drug benefit after the change. 
Gaynor et al. (2006) also found dynamics in the response to cost-sharing increase.  
Their estimates imply that a $1 increase in prescription drug spending would result in a 
$0.23 decrease in outpatient spending in the first year after the prices changes and a $0.41 
decrease in the second year after the price changes.  They found that prescription drug 
prices have no significant effect on inpatient care in general but found large positive price 
effects for individuals who had positive inpatient care.  Our estimates should be 
interpreted as the substitution effect at the steady state.  Our estimate for the substitution 
effect between prescription drugs and outpatient care (Medicare Part B) is virtually 
identical to the estimate from Gaynor et al. (2006) in the second year after the price 
changes.  Our finding of a significant substitution effect between prescription drugs and 
Medicare Part A (inpatient care) is consistent with their story that there is large 
substitution effect between prescription drugs and inpatient care for sick individuals, 
since Medicare beneficiaries are on average much sicker than working age adults.  As 
prescription drugs become increasingly integral to medical treatment of many illnesses, 
  - 27 - looking at drug spending in isolation from the rest of health care spending and the efforts 
simply to reduce drug spending may result in inefficient overall health care utilization. 
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  - 32 - Table 1: Medigap Plan Options
11
Benefit A  B  C D E F  G  H I J 
Basic Benefits  X  X X X X X  X  X  X  X 
Skilled Nursing Co-Insurance        X X X X  X  X  X  X 
Part A Deductible     X X X X X     X  X  X 
Part B Deductible        X     X           X 
Part B Excess               X 
100%
X 




Foreign Travel Emergency        X X X X  X  X  X  X 
At-Home Recovery          X      X     X  X 






Preventive Care            X             X 
All plans include the Basic Benefits: 
−  Hospitalization: Part A coinsurance ($210 per day from 61st to 90th day and $420 from 91st to 
150th day) plus coverage for 365 additional days after Medicare benefits end. 
−  Medical Expenses: Part B coinsurance (generally 20% of Medicare-approved expenses) 
−  Blood: First three pints of blood each year 
Plans F and J also have an option called a high deductible Plan F and high deductible Plan J. These high 
deductible plans pay the same or offer the same benefits as Plans F and J after one has paid a calendar year 
$1,650 deductible. Benefits from high deductible plans F and J will not begin until out-of-pocket expenses 
are $1,650. 
Out-of-pocket expenses for this deductible are expenses that would ordinarily be paid by the policy. These 
expenses include the Medicare deductibles for Part A and Part B, but do not include, in plan J, the plan's 
separate prescription drug deductible or, in plans F and J, the plans' separate foreign travel emergency 
deductible. 
                                                 
11 Source: http://insurance.mo.gov/consumer/senior/medsupp/options.htm 
 http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/02110.pdf 
  - 33 - Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  With drug benefit  Without drug benefit  Difference 
Age 75.142  75.611  -0.469  *** 
Male 0.385  0.387  -0.002   
Nonwhite 0.035  0.035  -0.000   
Married 0.565  0.567  -0.002   
College or above  0.139  0.097  0.043  *** 
Urban 0.674  0.647  0.027  *** 
Income/1,000 30.543  25.364  5.179  *** 
Self-reported health         
      Excellent  0.195  0.167  0.028  *** 
      Very good  0.297  0.287  0.010   
      Good  0.292  0.323  -0.031  *** 
      Fair  0.158  0.162  -0.003   
      Poor  0.057  0.061  -0.004   
Number of IADLs  0.531  0.509  0.022   
Number of ADLs  0.593  0.630  -0.036   
Diabetes 0.135  0.152  -0.016  ** 
Cancer 0.185  0.205  -0.020  *** 
Heart disease  0.382  0.385  -0.003   
Stroke 0.090  0.106  -0.015  *** 
Alzheimer’s 0.019  0.019  -0.000   
Hypertension 0.533  0.540  -0.007   
Arthritis 0.579  0.581  -0.002   
Lung disease  0.135  0.137  -0.002   
Died 0.033  0.033  -0.000   
Current smoking  0.109  0.115  -0.005   
Obese 0.151  0.153  -0.002   
Nursing home coverage  0.237  0.180  0.057  *** 
Log AAPCC  5.917  5.921  -0.004   
Prescription drug spending  817  678  139  *** 
Medicare Part A spending  2,537  2,775  -238   
Medicare Part B spending  1,852  1,788  65   
N 3,394  15,218   
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
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Medigap Drug Benefit  
Employer-Sponsored Drug 
Benefit 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std.  Error 
Age -0.005**  0.003 0.003***  0.003
Male -0.004  0.032 0.031**  0.032
Nonwhite -0.012  0.066 0.066**  0.059
Married -0.057**  0.028 0.028***  0.029
College and above  0.182*** 0.041 0.041  0.038
Urban 0.098**  0.038 0.038***  0.041
Income/1,000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000  0.000
Guaranteed Issue and rate rating  -0.086  0.060 0.060  0.065
Rate rating only  -0.363*** 0.133 0.133  0.148
Health Index  -0.001  0.004 0.005  0.005
Diabetes -0.030  0.043 0.035  0.037
Cancer -0.064**  0.036 0.031  0.033
Heart Disease  0.033  0.026**  0.028
Stroke -0.107*** 0.040  0.046
Hypertension 0.006  0.025*  0.027
Lung Disease  0.002  0.035  0.039
Arthritis 0.021  0.026**  0.027
Alzheimer’s 0.092 0.080  0.097
Current Smoking  -0.056  0.041  0.043
Obese -0.020  0.036  0.038
Died 0.046  0.064 0.064  0.071
AAPCC (log)  -0.055  0.078 0.078***  0.089
Year fixed-effects  Yes  Yes 
State fixed-effects  Yes  Yes 
Constant -0.735**  0.347 0.346***  0.367
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
Note: The sample for employer-sponsored drug benefit includes Medicare beneficiaries who had employ-
sponsored supplemental coverage with/without drug benefit. 
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Table 4: Spending Trends and State Reforms 
   Guaranteed-issue and rate-rating  Rate-rating only 
Part A spending, one year lag  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.003 
  0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 
Part B spending, one year lag  -0.017  -0.018  -0.009  -0.010 
  0.018 0.016 0.013 0.014 
Drug spending, one year lag  0.001  -0.015  0.044  0.015 
  0.045 0.042 0.029 0.036 
Part A spending, two year lag    0.009    -0.002 
   0.006   0.005 
Part B spending, two year lag    -0.003    0.012 
   0.018   0.016 
Drug spending, two year lag    0.014    0.041 
   0.049   0.047 
State fixed-effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year fixed-effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
P value for joint F statistic  0.805  0.455  0.411  0.776 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
Note: The analysis here was performed in the state level.  We computed the state average Medicare Part A, 
Medicare Part B and prescription drug spending by year for our study sample.  For states with reforms, we 
dropped the years after the reforms were implemented.  Linear probability models were used in the 
analysis. 
 Any Drug Spending  Log Drug Spending  Any Part A Spending  Log Part A Spending  Any Part B Spending  Log Part B Spending 
Variable  Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std. Error    Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std. Error 
Age 0.010  0.004 **  -0.009***  0.003 0.012*** 0.003 -0.033*** 0.004 0.014*** 0.005 -0.024*** 0.003 
Male -0.238  0.046 ***  -0.150***  0.036 0.079** 0.034 0.065  0.048 -0.192*** 0.049 -0.018  0.038 
Nonwhite -0.215  0.097 **  -0.082  0.076 -0.093  0.073 0.124  0.100 -0.160*  0.090 -0.111  0.078 
Married 0.097  0.043 **  0.004  0.031 -0.013  0.031 -0.035  0.044 0.128*** 0.044 0.028  0.034 
College or above  0.018   0.061 0.079  0.049 0.012  0.048 -0.009  0.080 0.192*** 0.071 0.041  0.051 
Urban 0.045  0.060   -0.084**  0.041 -0.042  0.041 -0.012  0.060 -0.035  0.062 -0.070  0.047 
Income/1,000 0.001  0.001   0.001***  0.000 -0.001  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.002  0.001 0.001**  0.000 
Health Index  0.076 ***  0.010 0.080***  0.005 0.116*** 0.005 0.050*** 0.006 0.045*** 0.009 0.116*** 0.005 
Diabetes 0.397  0.070 ***  0.354***  0.033 0.218*** 0.036 0.048  0.048 0.368*** 0.072 0.266*** 0.039 
Cancer 0.301  0.053 ***  0.099***  0.033 0.213*** 0.031 0.073*  0.042 0.490*** 0.060 0.493*** 0.035 
Heart Disease  0.552 ***  0.046 0.457***  0.027 0.354*** 0.027 0.152*** 0.041 0.414*** 0.044 0.452*** 0.030 
Stroke 0.065  0.076   0.098**  0.039 0.218*** 0.038 0.000  0.051 0.108  0.078 0.092**  0.043 
Hypertension 0.719  0.041 ***  0.572***  0.029 0.086*** 0.028 0.022  0.041 0.363*** 0.041 0.078**  0.031 
Lung Disease  0.458 ***  0.070 0.354***  0.036 0.171*** 0.036 -0.066  0.049 0.287*** 0.068 0.282*** 0.043 
Arthritis 0.221  0.038 ***  0.081***  0.028 0.047*  0.028 -0.064  0.040 0.282*** 0.040 0.188*** 0.031 
Alzheimer’s -0.115  0.141   -0.164**  0.075 0.061  0.084 -0.083  0.088 -0.145  0.145 -0.305*** 0.095 
Current Smoking  -0.155 ***  0.054 -0.127***  0.044 -0.093** 0.047 -0.106  0.074 -0.322*** 0.055 -0.168*** 0.054 
Obese 0.008  0.056   0.047  0.035 -0.028  0.039 -0.191*** 0.062 -0.174*** 0.055 -0.014  0.045 
Died -0.775  0.082 ***  -0.842***  0.065 1.588*** 0.070 0.439*** 0.059 -0.105  0.102 0.683*** 0.064 
Nursing Home Coverage  0.048   0.045 0.019  0.031 0.048  0.033 0.037  0.050 0.076  0.047 0.069**  0.035 
AAPCC (Log)  0.167 *  0.120 0.259***  0.088 0.113  0.084 0.655*** 0.125 0.330*** 0.123 0.997*** 0.095 
Prescription Drug Benefit  -0.153 **  0.067 0.230***  0.040 -0.082*  0.042 -0.017  0.053 -0.125*  0.072 -0.005  0.045 
Interaction with income/1,000  0.004 **  0.002 0.000  0.001 0.002** 0.001 0.000  0.001 0.003  0.002 0.001  0.001 
Year Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   
State Fixed-effects  Yes         Yes     Yes  Yes     Yes  Yes   
Constant -1.516  0.450 ***  4.256***  0.363 -3.394*** 0.362 7.031*** 0.555 -2.592*** 0.489 1.389*** 0.408 
Table 5: Estimates from Simple Two-Part Model 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
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Drug Benefit  Any Spending  Spending | Any 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std.  Error 
Age  -0.003   0.003 0.010**  0.004  -0.012 ***  0.002
Male  -0.005   0.031 -0.294*** 0.042  -0.086 ***  0.022
Nonwhite  -0.013   0.066 -0.238*** 0.093  -0.046   0.045
Married  -0.053 *  0.028 0.099**  0.039  0.010   0.019
College and above  0.179 ***  0.041 0.010  0.060  0.080 ***  0.032
Urban  0.099 ***  0.038 0.013  0.055  -0.030   0.026
Income/1,000  0.001 ***  0.000 0.001  0.001  0.001 ***  0.000
Guaranteed-issue and rate rating  1.065 *** 0.328        
Rate-rating only  -1.504 * 0.793        
Age*Guaranteed-issue -0.015  *** 0.004        
Age*Rate-rating  0.013   0.010       
Health Index* Guaranteed-issue  0.000   0.012       
Health Index*Rate-rating  0.035   0.027       
Health Index  -0.002   0.005 0.091*** 0.010  0.067 ***  0.003
Diabetes  -0.033   0.035 0.463*** 0.066  0.254 ***  0.020
Cancer  -0.063 **  0.031 0.328*** 0.048  0.083 ***  0.020
Heart Disease  0.033   0.026 0.650*** 0.042  0.316 ***  0.017
Stroke  -0.109 ***  0.040 0.078  0.069  0.089 ***  0.024
Hypertension  0.004   0.026 0.871*** 0.038  0.313 ***  0.020
Lung Disease  0.002   0.035 0.523*** 0.066  0.260 ***  0.022
Arthritis  0.022   0.026 0.236*** 0.035  0.061 ***  0.018
Alzheimer’s  0.098   0.081 -0.165  0.128  -0.113 **  0.054
Current Smoking  -0.056   0.041 -0.173*** 0.052  -0.104 ***  0.031
Obese  -0.021   0.036 0.032  0.054  0.005   0.022
Died  0.048   0.065 -0.909*** 0.099  -0.609 ***  0.054
Nursing Home Coverage    0.076*  0.046  -0.003    0.021
AAPCC (log)  -0.048   0.078 0.236**  0.113  0.209 ***  0.057
Prescription Drug Benefit     -0.145**  0.068  0.221 ***  0.031
Interaction with income/1,000     0.004**  0.002 -0.001   0.000
Year Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
State Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
Constant  -0.989 ***  0.347 -1.287*** 0.500  5.043 ***  0.241
First Support  0.071   0.073 3.842*** 0.571  -3.080 ***  0.077
Second Support  -0.081 *  0.043 3.016*** 0.694  -1.168 ***  0.059
Third Support  0.017 
† -0.971
†  0.461 
†  
Probability of First Support  0.041 ***               
Probability of Second Support  0.194 ***             
Probability of Third Support  0.765 
‡              
Standard Error              0.712 ***  0.010
 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
†: Computed as the following:  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 12 2 11 1 13 p p p p − − + − = η η η  
‡: Computed as the following:  =1- -   3 p 1 p 2 p
  - 38 - Table 7: Discrete Factor Estimates on Medicare Part A Spending 
Drug Benefit  Any Spending  Spending | Any 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std.  Error 
Age  -0.003   0.003 0.015*** 0.003  -0.032 ***  0.004
Male  -0.004   0.031 0.091**  0.037  0.059   0.040
Nonwhite  -0.011   0.066 -0.104 0.077  0.087   0.085
Married  -0.055 **  0.028 -0.014  0.034  -0.068 *  0.039
College and above  0.179 ***  0.041 0.014  0.053  0.017   0.066
Urban  0.098 **  0.038 -0.054  0.046  0.010   0.052
Income/1,000  0.001 ***  0.000 -0.001  0.001  0.000   0.000
Guaranteed-issue and rate rating  1.069 *** 0.330        
Rate-rating only  -1.518 * 0.799        
Age*Guaranteed-issue -0.015  *** 0.004        
Age*Rate-rating  0.013   0.011       
Health Index* Guaranteed-issue  0.000   0.012       
Health Index*Rate-rating  0.035   0.027       
Health Index  -0.001   0.005 0.153*** 0.011  0.064 ***  0.006
Diabetes  -0.034   0.035 0.238*** 0.040  0.038   0.042
Cancer  -0.065 **  0.031 0.256*** 0.039  0.073 **  0.037
Heart Disease  0.034   0.026 0.416*** 0.033  0.127 ***  0.034
Stroke  -0.109 ***  0.040 0.279*** 0.049  0.020   0.045
Hypertension  0.005   0.026 0.091*** 0.031  0.036   0.034
Lung Disease  0.001   0.036 0.195*** 0.043  -0.061   0.041
Arthritis  0.023   0.026 0.056*  0.031  -0.027   0.035
Alzheimer’s  0.099   0.081 0.142 0.106  -0.079   0.076
Current Smoking  -0.056   0.041 -0.118**  0.052  -0.059   0.062
Obese  -0.019   0.036 -0.023 0.043  -0.103  **  0.049
Died  0.047   0.065 3.010*** 0.552  0.585 ***  0.058
Nursing Home Coverage     0.060  0.038  0.029   0.042
AAPCC  (log)  -0.048   0.078 0.110 0.096  0.655  ***  0.108
Prescription Drug Benefit     -0.202**  0.092 -0.029   0.050
Interaction with income/1,000     0.003*  0.001 -0.000   0.001
Year Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
State Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
Constant  -0.995 ***  0.348 -4.477*** 0.475  6.566 ***  0.477
First Support  0.063   0.049 0.868*** 0.194  0.354 ***  0.060
Second  Support  0.016   0.171 0.186 0.224  -3.212  ***  0.168
Third Support  -0.180 
† -2.463
†  -0.406 
†  
Probability of First Support  0.703 ***               
Probability of Second Support  0.046 ***             
Probability of Third Support  0.251 
‡              
Standard Error              0.925 ***  0.013
 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
†: Computed as the following:  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 12 2 11 1 13 p p p p − − + − = η η η  
‡: Computed as the following:  =1- -   3 p 1 p 2 p
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Drug Benefit  Any Spending  Spending | Any 
Variable  Coefficient Std.  Error Coefficient Std. Error  Coefficient Std.  Error 
Age  -0.003   0.003 0.015*** 0.004  -0.025 ***  0.002
Male  -0.004   0.031 -0.242*** 0.045  0.058 **  0.028
Nonwhite  -0.011   0.066 -0.178**  0.085  -0.072   0.063
Married  -0.055 **  0.028 0.147*** 0.042  -0.010   0.025
College and above  0.180 ***  0.041 0.200*** 0.066  0.002   0.037
Urban  0.098 **  0.038 -0.028  0.057  -0.065 *  0.036
Income/1,000  0.001 ***  0.000 0.002**  0.001  0.000   0.000
Guaranteed-issue and rate rating  1.051 *** 0.328        
Rate-rating only  -1.513 * 0.795        
Age*Guaranteed-issue -0.015  *** 0.004        
Age*Rate-rating  0.013   0.011       
Health Index* Guaranteed-issue  0.000   0.012       
Health Index*Rate-rating  0.033   0.027       
Health Index  -0.002   0.005 0.052*** 0.010  0.112 ***  0.004
Diabetes  -0.031   0.035 0.404*** 0.068  0.197 ***  0.031
Cancer  -0.064 **  0.031 0.563*** 0.057  0.396 ***  0.026
Heart Disease  0.033   0.026 0.475*** 0.042  0.334 ***  0.023
Stroke  -0.110 ***  0.040 0.128*  0.071  0.045   0.034
Hypertension  0.007   0.026 0.402*** 0.038  0.012   0.023
Lung Disease  0.001   0.035 0.346*** 0.065  0.210 ***  0.031
Arthritis  0.021   0.026 0.342*** 0.037  0.077 ***  0.024
Alzheimer’s  0.097   0.081 -0.180 0.140  -0.229  ***  0.078
Current Smoking  -0.057   0.041 -0.369*** 0.052  -0.074 *  0.042
Obese  -0.021   0.036 -0.181*** 0.053  0.017   0.032
Died  0.046   0.065 -0.040 0.113  0.665  ***  0.057
Nursing Home Coverage     0.084*  0.049  0.054 *  0.028
AAPCC (log)  -0.050   0.078 0.454*** 0.119  0.803 ***  0.070
Prescription Drug Benefit     -0.124  0.078 -0.064   0.056
Interaction with income/1,000     0.003  0.002  0.001   0.001
Year Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
State Fixed-effects  Yes   Yes    Yes  
Constant  -0.970 ***  0.347 -2.906*** 0.745  2.859 ***  0.309
First Support  -0.064   0.047 0.345**  0.502  -0.841 ***  0.048
Second  Support  -0.005   0.061 7.494 9.570  -3.394  ***  0.060
Third Support  0.035 
† -0.732
†  0.778 
†  
Probability of First Support  0.332 ***               
Probability of Second Support  0.058 ***             
Probability of Third Support  0.610 
‡              
Standard Error              0.910 ***  0.015
 
*: Significant at 10%; **: Significant at 5%; ***: Significant at 1% 
†: Computed as the following:  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 12 2 11 1 13 p p p p − − + − = η η η  
‡: Computed as the following:  =1- -   3 p 1 p 2 p
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model  $830 $673  $157 
Prescription drug spending  Discrete factor with 
Income interaction  $821 $673  $148 
Simple two-part 
model  $2,602 $2,737 -$135 
Medicare Part A spending  Discrete factor with 
Income interaction  $2,422 $2,772 -$350 
Simple two-part 
model  $1,817 $1,786  $31 
Medicare Part B spending  Discrete factor with 
Income interaction  $1,729 $1,803  -$74 
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